Malone v. Brincat

722 A.2d 5 (1998)

Quick Summary

Doran Malone, Joseph P. Danielle, and Adrienne M. Danielle (plaintiffs) sued Mercury Finance Company’s directors (defendants) and KPMG (defendant), alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by providing false financial information. The lower court dismissed the case citing lack of fiduciary duty without shareholder action being sought.

Upon Appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that directors owe a continuous duty of honesty and allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint, thereby affirming part of the lower court’s ruling but reversing the dismissal with prejudice.

Facts of the Case

Shareholders Doran Malone, Joseph P. Danielle, and Adrienne M. Danielle (plaintiffs) initiated a lawsuit against the directors of Mercury Finance Company (defendants), a Delaware corporation, alleging that the directors breached their fiduciary duty by intentionally overstating the company’s financial health in disclosures to shareholders and the SEC. The plaintiffs claimed that due to these misrepresentations, Mercury’s value plummeted by approximately $2 billion. The complaint also accused KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (KPMG) (defendant) of aiding and abetting the Mercury directors’ fiduciary breach.

The plaintiffs argued that the directors’ actions violated their continuous duty to be honest in their communications with shareholders, contending that shareholders have the right to expect truthful information, regardless of whether the directors were actively seeking shareholder action. The directors and KPMG moved to dismiss the case, leading to a decision in the Court of Chancery that favored the defendants, stating that a fiduciary duty of disclosure only exists when seeking shareholder action.

Procedural Posture and History

  1. Plaintiffs filed an individual and class action suit in the Court of Chancery against Mercury’s directors and KPMG.
  2. Defendants moved for dismissal, arguing no fiduciary duty of disclosure was owed because they did not request shareholder action.
  3. The Court of Chancery granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice, concluding that under Delaware law, no fiduciary duty of disclosure exists without a request for shareholder action.
  4. Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Delaware.

I.R.A.C. Format


  • Whether directors have a fiduciary duty to disclose material information to shareholders even in the absence of a request for shareholder action, and if so,
  • Whether the plaintiffs can state a claim upon which relief can be granted for a breach of this duty.

Rule of Law

Directors who knowingly disseminate false information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate their fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner appropriate to the circumstances.

Reasoning and Analysis

The core principle established in this case is that directors have a constant fiduciary duty to shareholders encompassing due care, good faith, and loyalty. This fiduciary duty is not limited to times when shareholder action is solicited but applies to all director communications regarding corporate affairs. In the context of this case, the directors’ public statements about Mercury’s finances are subject to this duty.

Moreover, the court made a distinction between federal securities law—which governs disclosures related to market transactions—and state law, which imposes fiduciary duties on directors.

The court found that while federal law addresses fraud on the market, state law provides remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty outside the context of market transactions.

As such, the court ruled that the plaintiffs may have grounds for a derivative claim on behalf of Mercury or an individual claim for damages due to the alleged false disclosures by directors.


The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Chancery’s dismissal. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to state a cognizable cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by the directors and KPMG’s alleged aiding and abetting.

Key Takeaways

  1. Directors have a continuous fiduciary duty to shareholders, which includes honesty in all communications about corporate affairs.
  2. The Delaware Supreme Court recognizes that this duty persists even when there is no request for shareholder action.
  3. A breach of this fiduciary duty can lead to derivative or individual claims against directors.
  4. The court distinguishes between federal securities law addressing market transactions and state law concerning fiduciary duties.

Relevant FAQs of this case

What are the legal consequences for a director if they breach their fiduciary duty of disclosure?

Directors who breach their fiduciary duty of disclosure can face lawsuits from shareholders for any damages or losses suffered due to the nondisclosure or misrepresentation of material facts. Courts can hold directors personally liable and order them to compensate the shareholders or the corporation. Additionally, directors may be subject to equitable remedies such as injunctive relief or corporate governance changes imposed by the court.

  • Example: A director falsely asserts that the company has secured a lucrative contract, elevating stock prices. When the truth emerges, and stock value plummets, affected shareholders may sue for losses incurred from buying shares at the inflated price.

How does a director's duty of care relate to their communication with shareholders?

A director’s duty of care requires them to be reasonably informed when making decisions and communicating those decisions to shareholders. This includes an obligation to ensure that all disseminated information is accurate and complete, avoiding negligent misstatements which could potentially harm the shareholders or the corporation.

  • Example: Before announcing a merger, a director must verify all relevant information and disclose any material risks to prevent misleading shareholders about the potential benefits and drawbacks of the merger.

In what ways can a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors impact individual shareholders?

A breach can have financial ramifications for individual shareholders by affecting stock prices, diminishing the value of their investments, or causing misinformation that leads to poor decision-making. It can also erode trust in corporate governance and reduce investor confidence in management’s ability to act in the best interests of the company.

  • Example: If directors misstate earnings leading investors to hold stock expecting growth, and subsequent corrections cause a sharp decline in value, individual shareholders may experience significant financial losses.
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