In re Medtronic, Inc. Shareholder Litigation

900 N.W.2d 401 (2017)

Quick Summary

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Kenneth Steiner (plaintiff) challenged the merger between Medtronic, Inc. (defendant) and Covidien plc, alleging that shareholders suffered unreimbursed tax liabilities and diluted interests.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether these claims were direct or derivative in nature. The Court concluded that most claims were direct, as they pertained to shareholder-specific injuries, affirming in part and reversing in part the lower court’s decisions.

Facts of the Case

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Medtronic, Inc. (defendant), a Minnesota corporation, entered into a merger agreement with Covidien plc, an Irish company. This merger resulted in the formation of a new Irish corporation where Medtronic shareholders retained a 70 percent interest. However, the merger triggered a capital gains tax for Medtronic shareholders, for which they were not compensated. In contrast, Medtronic directors were reimbursed for an excise tax incurred on their stock compensation as part of the merger.

Kenneth Steiner (plaintiff) filed a class action lawsuit against Medtronic and its board of directors, alleging that shareholders suffered due to the unremunerated tax liability, the directors’ excise tax reimbursement, and the dilution of their voting power in the new corporation.

Procedural History

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  1. Kenneth Steiner filed a class action lawsuit against Medtronic and its directors.
  2. The district court granted Medtronic’s motion to dismiss based on the argument that the claims were derivative and Steiner had not made a demand on the board.
  3. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some claims were direct and could proceed.
  4. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari.

I.R.A.C. Format

Issue

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Whether the claims asserted by Kenneth Steiner against Medtronic, Inc. and its board of directors are direct or derivative in nature.

Rule of Law

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A shareholder claim is derivative when it alleges an injury to the corporation itself, whereas a claim is direct when it alleges an injury to the shareholder that is separate and distinct from any injury to the corporation.

Reasoning and Analysis

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The Court focused on whether the alleged injuries were to the shareholders individually or to the corporation as a whole. The Court acknowledged the challenge in distinguishing between direct and derivative claims but emphasized the importance of identifying who was injured and who would benefit from any recovery.

The Court found that certain claims regarding dilution of ownership interest and voting power were direct because they specifically harmed shareholders, not the corporation.

Although Medtronic as a corporation may have benefited from the merger structure, it was the shareholders who directly experienced the alleged damages without compensation for tax liabilities or dilution of their interests. Therefore, these damages did not impact the corporation in a way that would make the claims derivative.

Conclusion

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The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals’ decision, ruling that most of Steiner’s claims were direct and remanding to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Key Takeaways

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  1. Shareholder claims are considered direct when they allege damages to shareholders that are distinct from any harm to the corporation itself.
  2. The nature of the damages determines whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative; dilution of ownership interest and voting power constitutes direct harm to shareholders.
  3. Merger transactions can lead to complex legal challenges regarding shareholder rights and corporate responsibilities.

Relevant FAQs of this case

What determines whether a shareholder's claim is direct or derivative?

A shareholder’s claim is determined to be direct when the shareholder himself has suffered an injury that is independent of any injury to the corporation. In contrast, a claim is derivative when the harm alleged is primarily to the corporation, and any injury to the shareholders arises secondarily as a result of the harm to the corporation. The distinction hinges on who actually suffers the harm and who would receive the benefit of any remedy or recovery.

  • For example: If a shareholder incurs personal financial losses due to misleading statements by the company that affect stock value, this would be a direct claim. However, if the misleading statements harm the company’s reputation causing loss in corporate value, any resulting loss in stock value would be treated as a derivative claim.

How does corporate merger activity potentially impact shareholder rights?

Corporate mergers can lead to various changes that affect shareholder rights such as dilution of equity, shifts in voting power, changes in dividend payments, and exposure to new kinds of risks. The treatment of shareholders during a merger, including financial impacts like tax liabilities and how these are handled by the corporation, can give rise to legal actions by shareholders.

  • For example: A merger that results in shareholders being issued new shares in a different corporation may dilute their voting power if the total number of shares increases. This shift could be challenged as impinging on their rights.

What constitutes an injury 'separate and distinct' from any injury to a corporation for purposes of a shareholder lawsuit?

An injury is considered ‘separate and distinct’ when a shareholder experiences damage that does not affect all shareholders equally and does not primarily impact the corporation itself. This might include situations where there are breaches of fiduciary duties owed specifically to certain shareholders or when there are contractual arrangements unique to certain shareholders.

  • For example: Shareholders in preferred stock agreements receiving dividends might suffer distinct injuries if the company arbitrarily decides not to pay dividends solely to preferred shareholders while it continues payments to common shareholders. This would be specific harm to those particular shareholders’ rights.
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