A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.

309 N.W.2d 285 (1981)

Quick Summary

A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. (plaintiff) and other farmers sued Cargill, Inc. (defendant), following Warren Grain & Seed Co.’s bankruptcy and failure to fulfill grain sale contracts. The legal dispute centered on whether Cargill’s extensive financial and operational involvement with Warren made it liable as a principal.

The issue presented to the court was whether this involvement constituted an agency relationship. The Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that Cargill acted as a principal and upheld the jury’s verdict, affirming Cargill’s liability for Warren’s defaults.

Facts of the Case

Warren Grain & Seed Co.’s (Warren) financial collapse and subsequent default on grain sale contracts with A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. (plaintiff) and other farmers. Cargill, Inc. (defendant) had entered into a financial arrangement with Warren, providing loans and becoming heavily involved in Warren’s operations, including internal management decisions and daily financial oversight.

Over time, this relationship evolved to a point where Cargill was considered to have de facto control over Warren, which resulted in Warren acting as an agent for Cargill in certain transactions. When Warren went bankrupt, the farmers sought to hold Cargill liable for Warren’s obligations, arguing that Cargill acted as a principal in their dealings with Warren.

Procedural Posture and History

  1. The plaintiff farmers brought an action against both Warren and Cargill to recover losses from grain sale contracts after Warren defaulted.
  2. The jury trial resulted in a verdict favoring the plaintiffs, establishing Cargill’s liability as a principal.
  3. Cargill appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.

I.R.A.C. Format


Whether Cargill, Inc., by its involvement with Warren Grain & Seed Co., became liable as a principal for the contracts made by its agent, Warren.

Rule of Law

Agency is a fiduciary relationship resulting from one party consenting to another acting on their behalf and subject to their control. A creditor who assumes control over its debtor’s business may become liable as a principal for the acts of the debtor in connection with the business.

Reasoning and Analysis

The case turned on whether Cargill’s relationship with Warren constituted an agency relationship, rendering Cargill liable as a principal for Warren’s contractual obligations. The court scrutinized numerous factors indicating Cargill’s control over Warren, such as financing operations, influencing management decisions, having a right of first refusal on grain sales, and requiring approval for significant business transactions.

The court also considered past dealings where Warren acted as an agent for Cargill in separate projects, bolstering the argument that Warren operated under Cargill’s direction. The court differentiated this relationship from a typical creditor-debtor scenario, emphasizing the depth of Cargill’s involvement in Warren’s daily operations and decision-making processes.

Ultimately, it was concluded that Cargill’s ‘paternalistic’ approach and significant financial support went beyond lending and into the realm of control and agency, thus establishing liability for Warren’s defaults.


The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the jury’s findings that Cargill was liable as the principal for Warren’s obligations to the plaintiff farmers.

Key Takeaways

  1. An agency relationship can arise from a course of dealing between parties that involves control and influence over business operations.
  2. A creditor who assumes management and control over a debtor’s business may be held liable for the debtor’s business obligations.
  3. The extent of involvement in daily operations and financial oversight can transform a creditor-debtor relationship into one of principal-agent.

Relevant FAQs of this case

What factors determine if a creditor has crossed the line from a lender to a principal with agency control?

The key determinant is the degree of control exercised by the creditor over the debtor’s business operations. When a lender starts directing daily business activities, making management decisions, or requiring approval for significant transactions, an agency relationship might be formed. The creditor becomes responsible not just for lending money, but for the business conduct itself.

  • For example: If a bank not only lends money to a restaurant but also directs which suppliers to use, sets menu prices, and approves hiring decisions, the bank could be considered to have agency control over the restaurant.

How does a court differentiate between a principal-agent relationship and a typical creditor-debtor interaction?

Courts examine the autonomy the debtor possesses in conducting its business. In a principal-agent relationship, the agent acts on behalf of the principal with the principal’s authority and control. In contrast, a typical creditor-debtor relationship allows the debtor to operate independently without such interference.

  • For example: If an investor provides funding to a tech startup but also requires regular approval of business strategies, product designs, and contract negotiations, this could transform into a principal-agent relationship as opposed to a simple investment scenario.

What legal consequences arise when a creditor becomes an agent by exerting control over its debtor’s business?

The primary consequence is the potential liability of the creditor for obligations and contracts entered into by the debtor. Once recognized as an agent, the creditor assumes responsibility for the actions conducted within the scope of that agency, similar to how a company is liable for its employee’s work-related actions.

  • For example: If a software development firm exerts control over a contracted freelance developer to the extent of directing specific work hours and providing detailed instructions akin to an employee, this could result in employer liability for that developer’s actions on projects.


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