Quick Summary
Davis (plaintiff), African American applicants challenged their rejection from the Washington, D.C. police department, alleging racial discrimination due to a verbal skills test where defendants included the mayor of Washington, D.C. The dispute centered on whether this test’s disproportionate failure rate among African Americans constituted unconstitutional discrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence of intentional discrimination and that disproportionate impact alone does not prove a constitutional violation. The validity of Test 21 was therefore upheld.
Facts of the Case
Davis (plaintiff), an African American man, along with another African American, applied to join the Washington, D.C. police department. They were both rejected after failing a verbal skills test known as Test 21, which had a higher failure rate among African American applicants.
Alleging racial discrimination, they filed suit against Washington (defendant), the mayor of Washington, D.C., claiming that the police department’s hiring practices, including the use of Test 21, were racially discriminatory in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and D.C. Code § 1-320.
The case centered on the assertion that Test 21 was not directly related to job performance and disproportionately excluded African Americans from being hired as police officers. The plaintiffs did not claim intentional discrimination but rather that the impact of the test was discriminatory.
Procedural History
- Two African American police officers initiated a lawsuit against the Commissioner of the District of Columbia and other officials, alleging racially discriminatory promotion policies.
- Harley and Sellers (plaintiffs) intervened in the lawsuit, claiming discrimination in hiring practices based on the use of Test 21.
- The federal district court ruled in favor of Washington, finding no intentional discrimination and a reasonable relationship between Test 21 and the police training program requirements.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, basing its ruling on disproportionate impact alone, without regard to discriminatory intent, following standards from Title VII cases.
- The case was then taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari.
I.R.A.C. Format
Issue
Whether a hiring practice that disproportionately impacts a racial group is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment without proof of discriminatory intent.
Rule of Law
Discriminatory purpose is necessary to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; a law or practice with a disproportionate impact on a racial group is not unconstitutional solely because of its impact.
Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ application of Title VII standards to a constitutional claim. The Supreme Court emphasized that constitutional standards for claims of racial discrimination differ from those under Title VII. The Court clarified that while discriminatory impact can indicate possible unconstitutional behavior, it cannot stand alone as proof without evidence of an intentional discriminatory purpose.
The Court analyzed past cases where disproportionate impact was not enough to prove discrimination without showing intent or purpose behind it. In this case, the Court found no evidence of intentional discrimination in the use of Test 21 by the police department.
The test was used across the federal service and was not specifically designed to exclude African Americans. Additionally, the police department made significant efforts to recruit African American officers. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim did not meet the constitutional standard requiring proof of discriminatory intent.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and upheld the validity of Test 21, concluding that respondents failed to prove unconstitutional discrimination in hiring practices based on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Key Takeaways
- The Equal Protection Clause requires proof of intentional discrimination to establish a constitutional violation.
- A racially neutral law or practice that has a disproportionate impact on a racial group is not necessarily unconstitutional without evidence of discriminatory intent.
- Standards from Title VII employment discrimination cases do not automatically apply to claims under the Equal Protection Clause.
Relevant FAQs of this case
What constitutes 'intentional discrimination' in the context of employment law?
Intentional discrimination, often termed ‘disparate treatment,’ occurs when an employer deliberately treats an individual less favorably because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It involves showing that the employer’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent.
- For example: A company has a policy to exclude candidates from employment based on a background check but only enforces this policy for candidates of a certain ethnicity. This selective enforcement demonstrates intentional discrimination.
How might a neutral employment policy inadvertently lead to discriminatory impact?
A neutral employment policy might inadvertently lead to discriminatory impact if it disproportionately affects members of a protected class without being job-related or essential to the business. Such impact is termed ‘disparate impact.’
- For example: A firm requires all employees to pass a physical strength test, which is not essential for job performance. If the test outcomes significantly disadvantage one gender over another, it could be considered discriminatory despite the policy’s neutral language.
In what ways do constitutional standards for proving racial discrimination differ from those under Title VII?
Constitutional claims require proof of intentional discrimination or ‘disparate treatment,’ whereas Title VII of the Civil Rights Act allows claims based on either intentional discrimination or policies that have a ‘disparate impact’ on protected classes, regardless of an employer’s intent.
- For example: An employer who unintentionally adopts a hiring practice that statistically disadvantages a racial minority group may not be in violation of constitutional standards but could still face liability under Title VII if the practice is not necessary for the job and alternatives exist that would have less discriminatory effects.
References
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