Quick Summary
Yvonne Marquay, Lisa Burns, and Jennifer Snyder (plaintiffs) sued Michael Eno, Brian Adams, Brian Erskine, and other school employees (defendants) for sexual abuse and failure to report such abuse as required by state law. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed whether state statutes provided a private right of action for such failures and whether common law duties applied.
The court concluded there was no private right of action under the state statute but recognized common law duties based on special relationships. It held that established common law remedies were adequate without creating a new constitutional tort.
Facts of the Case
Yvonne Marquay, Lisa Burns, and Jennifer Snyder (plaintiffs), were students in the Mascoma Valley Regional School District who claimed they were sexually abused by school employees Michael Eno, Brian Adams, and Brian Erskine (defendants).
The plaintiffs also alleged that other school employees, including teachers, coaches, superintendents, principals, and secretaries (defendants), knew or should have been aware of the abuse. The complaints did not specify where the abuse occurred or whether it happened during school hours.
The plaintiffs sought damages on various State and federal theories, including negligence, assault and battery, due process and equal protection violations under the State Constitution, and failure to report the abuse as required by state law.
Yvonne Marquay was allegedly abused by Michael Eno starting in the seventh grade and by Brian Adams beginning in high school. Lisa Burns claimed she was sexually abused by Brian Erskine starting in her sophomore year and continuing beyond graduation. Jennifer Snyder alleged abuse by Michael Eno beginning in the seventh grade and continuing after graduation.
Procedural Posture and History
- The plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
- The defendants moved to dismiss various State law claims.
- The district court certified questions regarding State law to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
I.R.A.C. Format
Issue
- Whether RSA 169-C:29 creates a private right of action for failure to report sexual abuse.
- Whether New Hampshire common law imposes a duty to protect students from sexual misconduct by reporting to authorities or taking other measures.
- Whether any duty to report extends beyond the plaintiffs’ graduation from high school.
- Whether failure to report or the conduct of the abusers constitutes a violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under Part I, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution.
Rule of Law
The violation of a penal statute is an actionable wrong only when the legislature expressly provides for civil liability or when such intent can be inferred from the statute’s language and purpose. Additionally, a person may be liable for negligence if they have a special relationship with another that imposes a duty to protect them from foreseeable harm.
Reasoning and Analysis
The court differentiated between statutorily expressed or implied causes of action and negligence. It concluded that RSA 169-C:29 does not create a private right of action because there was no express or implied legislative intent to impose civil liability for its violation.
Regarding common law duties, the court recognized that schools have a special relationship with students that imposes certain duties of reasonable supervision. However, this duty is limited to those school employees who have supervisory responsibility over students.
The court also acknowledged that schools and certain officials may be liable for negligent hiring or retention if they knew or should have known an employee posed a risk to students. The court found that the statutory standard of care under RSA 169-C:29 was not applicable in cases based on inadequate supervision but could be relevant in negligent hiring or retention cases.
Conclusion
The court held that there is no private right of action under RSA 169-C:29 for failure to report sexual abuse. However, common law duties exist based on special relationships between school employees and students, as well as between school officials and abusing employees. Liability may extend beyond graduation if there is a causal connection between employment and injury. Established common law remedies were deemed adequate, so no new constitutional tort was recognized under these facts.
Key Takeaways
- RSA 169-C:29 does not create a private right of action for failure to report child abuse.
- School employees with supervisory responsibilities over students owe them a duty of care based on a special relationship.
- Schools may be liable for negligent hiring or retention if they knew or should have known about an employee’s propensity for abuse.
- Liability for abuse may extend beyond graduation if there is a causal connection to the employment.
- No new constitutional tort was recognized as existing common law remedies were deemed adequate.
Relevant FAQs of this case
What constitutes a 'special relationship' that imposes a duty of care under common law?
A ‘special relationship’ arises when one party is in a position of dependency on another who has a corresponding duty to protect them. In the context of jurisprudence, this can involve relationships such as parent-child, teacher-student, or doctor-patient. It is characterized by trust, reliance, and control where the dependent party is vulnerable to risks that can be mitigated by the protective party.
- For example: A lifeguard at a public pool has a special relationship with swimmers and therefore a duty to monitor their safety and respond to emergencies.
How does negligence per se differ from common law negligence?
Negligence per se is a legal doctrine where an act is considered negligent because it violates a statute or regulation. This differs from common law negligence which is based on the failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, without there necessarily being any statutory violation.
- For example: If an electrician fails to adhere to electrical standards enacted by legislature resulting in injury, this may be considered negligence per se, while if they simply were inattentive while wiring and caused injury, it could constitute common law negligence.
Can liability for negligence extend beyond formal relationships like employment?
Yes, liability for negligence can extend beyond formal relationships when the nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury can be established. The key factor is whether the harm was foreseeable and whether the defendant had an opportunity to prevent it.
- For example: A sporting club might be held liable for injuries caused by a defect in equipment rented out to members, even after membership has lapsed, if they knew the equipment was hazardous and failed to warn past users.
References
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