Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck

139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019)

Quick Summary

Deedee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez (plaintiffs) sued Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC) and Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN) (defendants) after being suspended from MNN’s public access cable channels. The dispute centered on whether MNN’s operation of these channels constituted state action and if First Amendment restrictions applied.

The Supreme Court held that MNN is not a state actor when operating public access channels and is not subject to First Amendment constraints on its editorial decisions. The decision was based on the understanding that operating public access channels has not been an exclusive governmental function historically.

Facts of the Case

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 led to the establishment of public access channels on cable systems, which must be operated by the cable operator unless a local government or designated private entity takes over. In Manhattan, Time Warner, the cable operator, reserved channels as mandated by New York law. The City of New York appointed a private nonprofit, Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), operating under Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN) (defendants), to manage these channels.

Deedee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez (plaintiffs) produced a film critical of MNN’s operations in East Harlem, which was aired on MNN’s public access channels. Following the airing, MNN suspended both plaintiffs from its services, prompting them to sue MNN and MCAC for allegedly violating their First Amendment rights by restricting access based on their film’s content.

The case evolved into an exploration of whether MNN, as a private entity operating public access channels, could be considered a state actor and thus subject to First Amendment constraints. The legal proceedings focused on the nature of public access channels and the role of private entities in managing such platforms for speech.

Procedural Posture and History

  1. Halleck and Melendez filed a lawsuit against MNN and MCAC in federal district court.
  2. The district court dismissed the case, concluding MNN was not a state actor.
  3. The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, holding that MNN was a state actor.
  4. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreements among appellate courts.

I.R.A.C. Format


Whether a private nonprofit corporation designated by a city to operate public access channels on a cable system is considered a state actor subject to First Amendment constraints on its editorial discretion.

Rule of Law

A private entity may be deemed a state actor when it exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. However, few functions fall into this category, and they typically involve activities that have been historically and exclusively performed by government entities.

Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court analyzed whether operating public access channels on a cable system is a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. They found that since the 1970s, both private and public entities have operated such channels, indicating that this function has not been exclusively governmental.

The Court also considered whether providing a forum for speech is a traditional public function but concluded that merely hosting speech does not transform private entities into state actors.

Furthermore, the Court noted that New York City’s designation of MNN to operate the channels, along with state regulation, did not convert MNN into a state actor. The Court emphasized that heavy regulation or government contracting with private entities does not make those entities state actors unless they perform functions exclusive to the state.


The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision, ruling that MNN is not a state actor subject to First Amendment constraints on its editorial discretion over public access channels.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice SOTOMAYOR, joined by Justices GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, dissented, arguing that the majority’s ruling undermines the First Amendment’s role in protecting free speech on public access channels.

Key Takeaways

  1. Private entities operating public access channels are not automatically considered state actors.
  2. The provision of a public forum for speech by a private entity does not subject the entity to First Amendment constraints.
  3. Government designation or regulation of a private entity does not convert that entity into a state actor absent traditional, exclusive public functions.

Relevant FAQs of this case

What distinguishes a private entity from becoming a state actor in the context of performing public functions?

To determine when a private entity is considered a state actor, the key factor is whether the entity exercises powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State. This distinction often depends on whether the private entity’s function has been historically governmental in nature.

  • For example: A privately-owned prison may be deemed a state actor because incarceration has traditionally been an exclusively state function.

How does a government regulation influence a private entity's status as a state actor?

Simply being heavily regulated by the government does not turn a private entity into a state actor. It is the performance of a function traditionally exclusive to the state, and not just regulation, that can result in classification as a state actor.

  • For example: A hospital following strict health and safety regulations imposed by the government remains a private actor unless it performs tasks typically done by the state, such as operating a public health facility.

In what ways can private property used for public speech be subject to First Amendment constraints?

Private property becomes subject to First Amendment constraints if it is designated by the state as a traditional public forum, where discrimination based on viewpoint may be prohibited.

  • For example: A town square privately owned but opened up for public rallies and demonstrations could be subject to First Amendment scrutiny when managing speech activities.


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