C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

511 U.S. 383, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 128 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1994)

Quick Summary

C & A Carbone, Inc. (defendant) operated a recycling plant in Clarkstown and was affected by a local ordinance requiring all waste be processed at a town-designated facility. The Town of Clarkstown (plaintiff) enacted this ordinance to financially support the facility’s construction.

The dispute centered on whether this ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court concluded that it did indeed violate the Commerce Clause as it unfairly restricted market access to out-of-state competitors and favored local interests.

Facts of the Case

In the late 1980s, the Town of Clarkstown, New York (plaintiff) committed to closing an existing landfill and establishing a new waste processing facility. The town implemented a flow control ordinance mandating that all solid waste within its jurisdiction be processed at this new facility, which was constructed and operated by a private contractor.

The contractor was allowed to charge a fee to handle the waste, which would eventually cover the cost of the facility’s construction.

C & A Carbone, Inc. (defendant) owned a competing recycling plant in Clarkstown. Under the new ordinance, Carbone was compelled to send non-recyclable waste to the town’s facility and pay the associated fee. Carbone sought to avoid these costs by illegally transporting waste out of state, which led to the town seeking legal action against them.

Procedural Posture and History

  1. C & A Carbone, Inc. challenged the flow control ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds after being caught illegally shipping waste out of state.
  2. The United States District Court initially granted an injunction in favor of Carbone, but this was dissolved following a state court ruling in favor of Clarkstown.
  3. The Appellate Division affirmed the state court’s decision.
  4. C & A Carbone, Inc. appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

I.R.A.C. Format


Whether the Town of Clarkstown’s flow control ordinance violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by requiring all solid waste within the town to be processed at a designated transfer station.

Rule of Law

Local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce or impede its free flow are generally invalid under the Commerce Clause unless the municipality can demonstrate that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest.

Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the flow control ordinance effectively discriminated against interstate commerce by allowing only one local facility to process waste within Clarkstown, thereby excluding out-of-state competitors. The Court ruled that such discrimination is inherently invalid unless it serves a legitimate local interest and no non-discriminatory alternatives exist.

Clarkstown’s justification for the ordinance as necessary for environmental protection and as a financing mechanism for the waste facility was insufficient. The Court highlighted that non-discriminatory alternatives existed, such as general taxes or municipal bonds, and that local governments cannot use their regulatory power to favor local enterprises over interstate competitors.


The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, ruling that the flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause, and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this decision.

Key Takeaways

  1. The Commerce Clause can invalidate local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce or impede its free flow.
  2. A local government cannot justify discriminatory regulations on the basis of revenue generation or environmental protection if non-discriminatory alternatives exist.
  3. The case reaffirms that economic protectionism is not a legitimate ground for discriminating against interstate commerce.

Relevant FAQs of this case

What is the impact of local laws on interstate commerce, and how does the Dormant Commerce Clause address this?

Local laws that favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state competitors can hinder free trade among states. The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits state and local governments from enacting regulations that excessively burden or discriminate against interstate commerce without compelling justification and congressional approval.

  • For example: A city ordinance requiring all restaurants to source ingredients exclusively from local farms would impede interstate trade as it discriminates against out-of-state producers.

How can municipalities legally support local businesses without violating the Commerce Clause?

Municipalities can support local businesses through non-discriminatory means such as providing subsidies, training, or promotional campaigns that do not exclude or disadvantage out-of-state enterprises.

  • For example: A town could offer a tax credit to all small businesses, regardless of location, for using renewable energy, thus incentivizing sustainable practices without discriminating against interstate commerce.

What are conceivable legal justifications for local governments to regulate commerce, and under what conditions might these regulations be upheld?

Local governments can regulate commerce to protect public health, safety, and welfare. These regulations are more likely to be upheld if they are evenly applied to both in-state and out-of-state entities and if no less-discriminatory alternatives are available.

  • For example: A state law that imposes safety standards on all trucks entering the state to protect roadways and travelers will likely be upheld if it applies equally to in-state and out-of-state trucks.


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